Abstract-This paper examines the role of individual risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new form of agricultural biotechnology in China. I conducted a survey and a field experiment to elicit the risk preferences of Chinese farmers, who faced the decision of whether to adopt genetically modified Bt cotton a decade ago. In my analysis, I expand the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility theory to incorporate prospect theory. I find that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt Bt cotton later. Farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt Bt cotton earlier.
I. Introduction
T ECHNOLOGICAL innovation drives economic development, and given the importance of technological innovation in improving living standards, delays in technology adoption have always puzzled economists. This paper examines the case of Chinese cotton farmers who were offered the opportunity to adopt genetically modified Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton. On its introduction, Bt cotton was backed by dramatic assertions from the scientific community that it would increase yields and lower pesticide costs by eliminating pests and was no riskier than traditional cotton crops in terms of yield risk. Given such promising claims and the eventual success of neighboring farms, this begs the question: Why did some cotton farmers wait almost ten years before switching to Bt cotton?
An extensive literature has attempted to answer this question.
1 It has been established that education (Aldana et al., 2011; Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995 , 1996 Huffman, 2001) , credit constraints (Croppenstedt, Demeke, & Meschi, 2003; Sunding & Zilberman, 2001; Barrett et al., 2004) , and learning spillover (Besley & Case, 1993; Conley & Udry, 2010; Munshi, 2004) are among the main determinants of technology diffusion. However, when a group of Chinese cotton farmers were asked why they did not adopt Bt cotton when it became available, 97% of them cited their uncertainty regarding its effectiveness in reducing pest infestation as the main reason (Yang et al., 2005) . The farmers' perceived uncertainty regarding Bt cotton allows individual risk preferences to play an important role in technology adoption, which is the main focus of this paper.
There are several reasons to focus on individual risk preferences. One is that risk preferences have long been recognized by the theoretical model of technology adoption as an important factor in the technology adoption decision-making process (Feder, 1980; Feder, Just, & Zilberman, 1985) . Omission of risk attitudes could bias the coefficient estimates of other variables that could potentially be correlated with risk attitudes, such as education and wealth. Second, individual risk preferences have empirically been shown to play a role in wealth accumulation and income growth in labor markets and financial markets (McInish, Ramaswami, & Srivastava, 1993; Shaw, 1996) . Finally, recent work by Dohmen et al. (2008) and Cesarini et al. (2009) finds an intergenerational correlation of risk attitudes. If the intergenerational link of risk preferences persists over time, it could potentially explain the low level of intergenerational income mobility and the difference in wealth accumulation. However, since risk preferences are not easily assessed through a standard household survey, the extent to which they play a role in wealth accumulation is less understood from an empirical perspective.
2 This paper is one of the first to examine the role of risk attitudes in technology adoption decisions.
This paper uses the introduction of genetically modified Bt cotton in China as a means to examine the issue of how risk attitudes affect technology adoption decisions. Bt cotton is a well-suited technology for this study as it does not require a large lump-sum investment (at most, the equivalent of five to ten days of rural wages). 3 The learning curve on the part of the farmers involved with planting Bt cotton is short because of the similarity between the planting methods of Bt cotton and traditional cotton. Bt cotton differs from traditional cotton only in that it carries the Bt gene, which creates toxins that kill bollworm, the primary cotton pest in China. Bt cotton is found to produce higher yield and no riskier than traditional cotton seed (Crost & Shankar, 2008; Krishna, Zilberman, & Qaim, 2009) . Given that Bt cotton yield is first-order stochastic dominating, we know that any delay in its adoption would clearly be a nonoptimal decision that could affect wealth accumulation. In 2006, I partnered with the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP), a government-affiliated research institute in Beijing, to conduct a household survey and field experiment. The survey covered information on household characteristics and the timing of Bt cotton adoption of 320 cotton farmers in four Chinese provinces. I then conducted a field experiment to elicit individual risk preferences. 4 Later I used these risk preference parameters to predict the timing of the farmers' Bt cotton adoption.
The common approach to characterize an individual risk preference is to use expected utility (EU), in which risk aversion is the sole parameter for determining the curvature of the utility function. In prospect theory (PT) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) , the shape of the utility function is jointly determined by risk aversion, loss aversion (which measures one's sensitivity to loss compared to gain), and nonlinear probability weighting (the individual tendency of overweighting small (large) probabilities and underweighting large (small) probabilities). In the context of technology adoption, there are two possibilities as to why EU theory could be inadequate in explaining farmers' decisions. The first is that Chinese farmers have a target income level that they are trying to reach, and they therefore become more sensitive to loss than gain at a target income level. Although it has not been formally tested whether target income levels exist in agricultural settings, many studies have provided evidence of target income levels in various scenarios that could not be explained by subsistence constraints (Camerer et al., 1997; Farber, 2008; Fehr & Goette, 2007; Rizzo & Zeckhauser, 2003) . The second possibility draws on the concept of status quo bias, also known as endowment effect, which indicates an individual's aversion to changing from an established behavior and is found to be an implication of loss aversion. Samuelson and Zechhauser (1988) tested status quo bias in both the field and lab settings before suggesting that it could explain brand loyalty. Applying status quo bias in technology adoption could potentially explain why farmers resist change. This is the first empirical paper to shed light on this topic, although the idea is mentioned in Mullainathan (2004) .
Ex ante, both EU and PT could act as potential theories for explaining the cotton farmers' decision-making processes. However, it is not clear which one is more appropriate. 5 Therefore, I use the experiment design modeled after that of Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2009; hereafter TCN) . The major advantage of the TCN design is that it allows the researcher to estimate empirical specifications that nest both EU and PT. It elicit three parameters: coefficient of risk aversion, loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting. TCN design also allows the results from the experiment to determine whether EU or PT better fits the data. Moreover, TCN's design has been tested in Vietnam with less educated subjects. The design is simple enough for less educated subjects to follow while allowing the researcher to estimate a sophisticated utility function.
To provide some intuition to guide us in how risk preference could dictate the adoption decision, I propose a simple model of technology adoption that incorporates individual risk preferences. Considering the previous finding that uncertainty surrounding Bt cotton's effectiveness in killing pests was the main factor deterring adoption, the model allows for the subjective view of risk associated with Bt cotton to be differed from the objective risk. The model assumes that individual adoption decisions would depend on farmers' subjective belief in Bt cotton efficacy and their view of pest severity in the upcoming season. The model predicts that if farmers perceived Bt cotton as ineffective in eliminating pests, then more riskaverse and more loss-averse farmers would adopt this cotton later. But if farmers view this cotton as effective in eliminating pests (as was advertised by scientists), then more risk-averse and more-loss averse farmers should adopt it sooner.
I use the parameters elicited from the experiment to relate to the Chinese farmers' decision to adopt the genetically modified Bt cotton. I find that farmers who behave more risk averse, or more loss averse, in the experiment adopt Bt cotton later, whereas farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt Bt cotton earlier. These findings are consistent with the model prediction in which farmers believe that Bt cotton is risk increasing upon adoption. Over time, farmers learn the objective risk of technology.
It is important to note that the findings in this paper do not undermine the importance of learning, social networks, or credit constraints in technology adoption. The result demonstrates that risk preferences play an important role in Bt cotton technology adoption, while at the same time complementing existing studies on technology adoption. For example, in studies on social learning (Conley & Udry, 2010; Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995) and social pressure (Maertens, 2009) , it remains unstated as to who the initial adopter would be in a particular social network when there is no one within the network from whom to learn. A model involving risk preferences would be able to explain the differences in the timing of technology adoption. In short, the empirical results in this paper do not attempt to discount the importance of learning about Bt cotton's planting method or learning about Bt cotton with regard to a new technology, but instead emphasize the participants' learning process regarding the objective risks of this new technology. This paper is organized as follows. Section II offers a review of the literature. Section III provides some background information on Bt cotton and describes the survey and data set. Section IV describes the design and procedure of the field experiment and presents descriptive analysis of the results from the field experiment. Section V uses a conceptual framework to describe the role of risk preferences in technology adoption decisions. Section VI presents a general econometric framework to test the predictions and describes the empirical results. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. Related Literature
Since the literature in technology adoption is vast, I discuss the two empirical studies most relevant to my study. Both of these papers elicit farmers' risk attitudes and use this measure to explain adoption decisions. Knight, Weir, and Woldehanna (2003) study technology adoption among Ethiopian farmers by dividing farmers into risk-averse and non-risk-averse groups depending on farmers' answer to a hypothetical question. They find that risk aversion is associated with lower probabilities of technology adoption. Engle-Warnick, Escobal, and Laszlo (2006) study Peruvian farmers' technology adoption decisions. Their experiment design is unique in that they are able to differentiate Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) aversion from risk aversion.
6 When Engle-Warnick et al. (2006) include measures of both uncertainty (ambiguity) aversion and risk aversion in the probit regression of adoption decisions when adopting the new technology would be equal to 1 and nonadoption would be equal to 0, neither regressor can predict the technology adoption decision. They do find that farmers who are more ambiguity averse are less likely to diversify across different crops.
Neither of these articles focuses on a single technology. Therefore, the adoption of innovation is arbitrarily defined. In Knight et al.'s (2003) study, technology adoption is a dichotomous variable that is set equal to 1 if a farmer has adopted at least one new agricultural input (fertilizer, pesticide) and one new crop. Engle-Warnick et al. (2006) ask farmers about the crop varieties they had planted during the previous Twelvemonth period, with the technology adoption variable being set equal to 1 if the farmers had planted any modern crop varieties. Since both studies use cross-sectional data, and their dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating adoption, when a farmer does not adopt, it could be due to many other reasons. For example, it is unclear whether the diffusions of all these innovations have reached the equilibrium. Moreover, new varieties of crops may not be superior to traditional crops in the surveyed regions, and therefore, nonadoption in the data could simply reflect that farmers do not find it profitable to plant those new crop varieties. My paper does not suffer from the same problem because ex post we know that the technology of focus in my study produces higher yields than traditional cotton. By the time the survey was conducted, the Bt cotton adoption rate in the surveyed region was 100%. Therefore, we know it has reached equilibrium. This paper differs from previous studies in that it is the first empirical paper that provides evidence that PT could play a role in explaining farmers' technology adoption decisions.
III. Background on Bt Cotton and the Bt Cotton Survey

A. Background on Bt Cotton
In recent years, China has become the world's largest cotton producer and consumer. However, cotton bollworm continued to destroy cotton harvests up until the late 1990s due to its ability to quickly build up resistance to pesticides (Karplus & Deng, 2008) . Bt cotton, which is bollworm resistant, was developed and tested in trial fields by Chinese scientists in the early 1990s and has been approved for commercial use in the provinces of Anhui, Hebei, and Shandong since 1997, and in Henan since 1999. Bt cotton was commercialized in 1997. Its earliest adoption of in my sample had occurred in 1993, and by 2004, every farmer in my sample had tried Bt cotton (as evidenced in figure 1).
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The success of Bt cotton is well documented (Bennett, Ismael, & Morse, 2005; Crost et al., 2007; Gandhi & Namboodiri, 2006; Narayanamoorthy & Kalamkar, 2006; Qaim et al., 2006) . According to Huang, Rozelle et al.'s (2002) study on Bt cotton production in China, the planting methods of Bt and traditional cotton seeds are similar. Upon introduction to the market, Bt cotton was more expensive and required somewhat more upfront costs (the equivalent of five to ten days of rural wages), but farmers could save nearly 28% in overall production costs through Bt cotton's lower pesticide and labor costs (Huang, Hu et al., 2002) .
If Bt cotton is such a successful product, then the natural question that arises is how to explain the ten-year lag between the first adopter and the last adopter. One might think that the Chinese government would have played some role in the farmers' decision regarding which type of cotton to plant. However, farmers are free to purchase seeds from various sources, such as agricultural extension agents, seed 6 Ambiguity (also known as Knightian uncertainty) aversion refers to the aversion to outcomes with unknown distribution, whereas risk aversion refers to the aversion to risky outcomes with known distribution. Interested readers can refer to Frank Knight's seminal 1921 work Camerer and Weber (1992) provide a survey of the more recent and innovative work on ambiguity and risk. 7 Approximately 16% of households had adopted Bt cotton prior to governmental approval. My communications with farmers suggested that they were not aware of the illegality of Bt cotton seeds before 1997. Pemsl (2006) 
B. Survey Procedure
The Bt Cotton Survey (2006) was designed and conducted by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) in Beijing, China. The objective of the survey was to evaluate the performance of the Bt cotton seed. Four provinces (Henan, Shandong, Hebei, and Anhui) with a high Bt cotton adoption rate were chosen to participate in the CCAP Bt cotton survey. 8 The CCAP selected two counties per province and two villages per county. 9 In each village, twenty households were randomly selected and surveyed. In the sample were 320 households. Within each household, we interviewed the family member who was most responsible for the farmwork. Survey participants were paid 10 yuan (one-third of the provinces' daily wage) for completing the survey. 10 Each survey covered detailed information on household characteristics and individual characteristics. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the key variables of interest from the household survey. The average interviewee in the sample has completed slightly more than the equivalent of an elementary school education (7.1 years) and is about 50 years old.
C. Data Description
11 In China, land is not privatized, and farmland is assigned to each household in villages (Brandt et al., 2002) . The average household in the sample is assigned 0.59 hectares of farmland. In the surveyed region, cotton is the major cash crop and is planted on 0.54 hectares of farmland per household, with farmers 8 See the online appendix for a map of China with cotton production regions and the location of survey sites. 9 One concern that has been raised is the survey's representativeness. In any study involving intensive, lengthy surveys such as this, one is necessarily constrained to choose a location that will be cooperative. The villages and counties selected were places in which it was feasible to implement the survey. I was responsible for the administration and execution of the survey, eliminating the possibility that a local bureaucrat could manipulate the data within any particular village. Moreover, in terms of the survey's representativeness, I compared this data set with the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data set, a large-scale, multistage, random cluster sample that is representative at the provincial level. CHNS overlaps with my samples in Shandong and Henan provinces in 2006, allowing me to compare the variables that are available in both samples. When I restrict the CHNS sample to farm households and compare it with my sample in Shandong and Henan provinces, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the samples from my survey and CHNS are the same in terms of education level and household size.
10 $US1 % 7.88 yuan on November 1, 2006. 11 The sample is relatively old since migration of young men out of villages is common (Rozelle, Taylor, & de Brauw, 1999) . 1389 TIME TO CHANGE WHAT TO SOW usually practicing rotational cropping by planting cotton in the spring and wheat in the winter. Ownership of a set of durable goods (DG) is used as a proxy for wealth in 2001 and 2006 . DG included in the survey include a color television, black-and-white television, VCD/DVD player, stereo system/boom box, camera, washer, water heating system, gas stove, refrigerator, car, motorcycle, cellular phone, and air conditioner. In this sample, all the farmers have experience planting Bt cotton seeds in their plots, and I asked a retrospective question about the year in which they first adopted it. Since I do not have the intensity of Bt cotton adoption over the years, the timing between exposure to Bt cotton and adoption is treated as the outcome of interest. One thing to note is that unlike studies by Suri (2011) and Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008) , which find that many farmers switch between adopting and disadopting a new technology, the disadoption rate of Bt cotton in the current study is low: only 5 out of 320 farmers disadopted Bt cotton in 2006. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to find out when farmers started planting Bt cotton, given that their decision is rarely retracted (see Liu & Huang, 2013 for information on farm and plot characteristics).
IV. Field Experiment Design and Procedure
A. Design of Field Experiment
All of the farmers who completed the interview also participated in a field experiment, which elicited their preferences regarding risk. The experimental design follows the methodology developed by TCN (2009), which has two major advantages:
1. While TCN incorporates PT, it does not reject EU outright. TCN can fall back on the use of EU theory while measuring three parameters concerning risk preferences in PT: risk aversion, loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting. 2. TCN has been tested on Vietnamese subjects who are at a comparable level of education to those in China. Many of the experiments used to elicit risk preferences are done in a lab setting with more educated subjects. TCN is simple enough for less educated subjects to follow and yet allows us to estimate a sophisticated utility function.
Following TCN, I assume a utility function of the following form:
Uðx; p; y; qÞ In the utility function, x and y are the outcomes, and p and q are the probability associated with these outcomes. s describes the curvature of the value function for an individual in which the individual is risk loving if s < 0, risk neutral if s ¼ 0, and risk averse if s > 0.
12 l defines the curvature below 0 relative to the curvature above 0. l = 1 implies a kink in the indifference curve around 0. High l signifies that an individual is more loss averse. The nonlinear probability weighting measure a is extended from a model by Prelec (1998) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) . Probabilities are weighted by the function w(p). If a < 1, w(p) has an inverted S shape, which indicates an overweighting of low probabilities and an underweighting of high probabilities. If estimates from the experiment give us a ¼ 1 and l = 1, the above model reduces to expected utility theory.
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B. Procedures of Experiment
In this study, participants were given three series of games that contain 35 pair-wise choices. Table 2 illustrates the game's entire payoff matrix. There are three independent series, each of which contain anywhere from 7 to 14 rows, with each row containing a choice between two lotteries: A or B. This is how series 1, row 1 in table 2 was presented to the subjects.
It shows that lottery A offers a 30% chance of receiving 20 yuan and a 70% chance of receiving 5 yuan, while lottery B offers a 10% chance of receiving 34 yuan and 90% chance of receiving 2.5 yuan. Each subject has to decide whether he or she prefers lottery A versus lottery B for each row within the series.
I followed TCN procedure by putting 10 numbered balls in a bag and then drawing the balls out of the bag to complete the randomization process. For example, if a subject 12 In the TCN paper, value function v(x) has the form v(
s for x < 0. For ease of understanding and comparison with respect to the conventional form of EU under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) in which u(x) ¼ x 1Às /(1 À s), I rewrite the value function as v(x) ¼ x 1Às . 13 This functional form, assuming that people are risk loving for losses and risk averse for gains, comes from PT and is referred to as the reflection effect. See Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for a more detailed discussion. See Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) , Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul (1990) , and Camerer (1989) for further empirical evidence of reflection effect. With l ¼ 1 and a ¼ 1, it reduces to a particular utility functional form.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS chooses lottery B for row 1 and the number 3 ball is drawn, he would earn 2.5 yuan. However, if he instead chooses lottery A, drawing the number 3 ball would earn him 20 yuan. In series 1, lottery A does not change, but as we proceed down the matrix, the expected value of lottery B increases and eventually exceeds that of lottery A. The record sheet (see the online appendix) asked subjects at which row (anywhere from row 1 to row 14) they would switch from lottery A to lottery B for series 1: ''I choose lottery A for row 1 to _____.'' ''I choose lottery B for row _____ to 14.'' Similar questions about switching points were asked for series 2. The more risk-averse individuals chose lottery A for a greater number of iterations before switching to lottery B than the less risk-averse individuals in both series 1 and Series 2. Following TCN's experiment procedure, I assume subjects are rational. Therefore, each subject is allowed to switch from lottery A to lottery B only once during each series.
14 The options of never switching (always choosing lottery A) or switching at row 1 (always choosing lottery B) were also available to all of the participants.
In order to estimate the parameter of loss aversion, payoffs were made to be positive or negative. Since it would have been unethical to have the farmers who participated in the game pay us money, I announced at the beginning of the game that by participating, the farmers would receive 10 yuan (which corresponds to roughly one-third of the average daily wage). In series 1 and series 2, all outcomes result in positive payoffs. However, in series 3, there is some probability that the outcome of the game will result in 90% winning 20 yuan and 10% winning 15 yuan 70% winning 65 yuan and 30% winning 2.5 yuan Series 3 1 50% winning 12.5 yuan and 50% losing 2 yuan 50% winning 15 yuan and 50% losing 10 yuan 2 50% winning 2 yuan and 50% losing 2 yuan 50% winning 15 yuan and 50% losing 10 yuan 3 50% winning 0.5 yuan and 50% losing 2 yuan 50% winning 15 yuan and 50% losing 10 yuan 4 50% winning 0.5 yuan and 50% losing 2 yuan 50% winning 15 yuan and 50% losing 8 yuan 5 50% winning 0.5 yuan and 50% losing 4 yuan 50% winning 15 yuan and 50% losing 8 yuan 6 50% winning 0.5 yuan and 50% losing 4 yuan 50% winning 15 yuan and 50% losing 7 yuan 7 50% winning 0.5 yuan and 50% losing 4 yuan 50% winning 15 yuan and 50% losing 5.5 yuan 14 It is also known as monotonic switching. There are debates in the literature as to whether to force monotonic switching. I decided to enforce it because it is the first time the TCN experiment has been used (other than with their Vietnam subjects). Had I not used monotonic switching and the results were dramatically different from TCN's Vietnam results, it would not be clear whether it is due to an incorrect execution of the experiments, that the individuals did not understand the experiment, or innate differences between the preferences of Chinese versus Vietnamese. Having known that the TCN experiment was run smoothly in Vietnam with subjects who are comparable in education level to those in this study is one of the main reasons I chose this experiment design. Therefore, I decided to adhere to TCN's protocol. 1391 TIME TO CHANGE WHAT TO SOW a negative payoff (the farmers will lose money), but the amount lost was calculated to never exceed the 10 yuan the farmers received for participating in the game. Questions about switching points are also asked during series 3. The more loss-averse individual would choose to switch from lottery A to lottery B later in series 3 or never switch at all (always choose lottery A). 15 Subjects were told that one of the 35 rows would be randomly chosen ex post and that the lottery they had selected would be played for actual stakes, with the outcome of that lottery determining their monetary payoff. Of the 320 farmers who completed the survey, 5 decided not to participate in the field experiment. The average payoff of the game is 30 yuan, approximately a single day's wage in rural China. The highest possible payoff of the game is 850 yuan. 16 (More details about the game's procedure are provided in the online appendix.)
C. Descriptive Analysis of Game Results
The distributions of switching points are shown in appendix 1. In our sample, 7.6% of farmers chose either only lottery A or only lottery B for all three of the game's series. One concern that arises is that the farmers could have been innumerate and therefore did not understand how the game works. 
D. Estimation of Parameters
Results from series 1 and series 2 are used to estimate the curvature of the utility function in the positive domain (s) and estimate the nonlinear probability weighting parameter (a) for each participant. The estimating procedure is provided in the next section.
For any subject who switches at row N, I can conclude that he prefers lottery A over lottery B at row N À 1 and prefers lottery B over lottery A at row N. I can obtain a set of two inequalities from this switching point. 18 Using a combination of switching points from series 1 and series 2, I am able to find the ranges of s and a that satisfy this pair of inequalities. For example, when a subject switches from lottery A to lottery B at row 7 for both series 1 and series 2, I know the following inequalities should be satisfied:
Parameters that satisfy these inequalities are 0.26 < s < 0.35 and 0.66 < a < 0.74. I follow TCN's convention of approximating s and a by taking the midpoint of the interval to one decimal place. In the above inequalities, we would use 0.3 and 0.7 as our estimates for s and a. After obtaining an estimate of s, we can write out inequalities involving l using the switching point from series 3. Similar to s and a, l can be estimated only as an interval, and I use the midpoint of each interval as the point estimate.
20 For ease of interpretation, I use the midpoint of each interval as the point estimate of l. In this sample, the average of l is 3.47.
21
The average of s is 0.48, indicating that people are risk averse. The average of a is 0.69, meaning that most people in the sample have a tendency to overweight low probabilities. 22 The distribution of s, a, and l parameters is shown in figure 2 . The correlation between s and l is 0.16, the correlation between s and a is 0.03, and the correlation between l and a is 0.13. As mentioned earlier, if both a ¼ 1 and l ¼ 1, TCN's value function would reduce to the standard EU function. Using an F test, I can reject the null hypotheses that a ¼ 1 and l ¼ 1 at the 1% level. Thus, I
15 As Camerer (1989) points out, losses that are in fact net gains, such as in series 3, may be treated differently from real losses. This is a typical problem with any experiment involving monetary losses. In the hope that the farmers would not treat the ten yuan as a windfall gain, we told them that the ten yuan was given to them to compensate their time spent with the experimenters. If they still treat the payment as a windfall gain, it is more difficult to find the existence of a kink around 0.
16 Holt and Laury (2002) find evidence that individuals exhibit more risk aversion in high-stakes games. Since I wish to relate the game results to their farming decisions, I employ a relatively high monetary payoff in the game to correspond more closely to the magnitude of monetary payoffs farmers faced in production decisions, which ultimately determine their livelihoods. Using a high monetary payoff is better than asking risk preference questions on the survey with hypothetical payoff since the survey questions are not incentive compatible and there are many reasons that the actual payoff could generate a less noisy risk preference measure compared to the hypothetical payoff (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999) . 17 A dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the subject chose only lottery A or only lottery B throughout all three series is constructed. I find that individuals with higher education are less likely to choose only lottery A or only lottery B throughout all three series. 18 In the case of ''never switch'' or ''switching at row 1,'' I have one inequality. Thus, I arbitrarily determine the lower/upper bound of the parameters, which is also TCN's approach. This arbitrariness could create noise in the data. Thus in the robustness check in table 6, I report regression results leaving out these individuals.
19 I follow TCN convention using the income from the game, rather than income plus existing wealth level, to estimate one's utility functional form. While it is a standard approach in the experimental economics literature (Holt & Laury, 2002) , in particular, in studies related to loss aversion, Rabin (2000) points out that individual utility is determined by change of wealth rather than the absolute wealth level. In the empirical analysis, I also did various specifications controlling for the initial wealth.
20 More details about estimation method can be found in Tanaka et al. (2009) . 21 Our estimate is higher than the conventional loss aversion coefficients (l$2) from studies performed in developed countries (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005) . 22 The TCN Vietnam sample consists of people in all professions. In their farmer subsample, the estimate of (1 À s), which is comparable to s in this paper, is 0.40; their estimate of a is 0.75, and their estimate of l is 3.00. Table 3 reports the OLS regression result using each of the risk preference parameters as a dependent variable. The explanatory variables I use are age, years of schooling, gender, wealth, religion, time spent on the farm, and land owned. Column 1 presents results using s as the dependent variable. I find that female farmers are more risk averse. The literature on whether individual risk attitudes vary with wealth has been inconclusive. 24 In this sample, the proxy for wealth (the value of DG per capita in 2006) can predict risk aversion at the 5% level. An interesting observation is that twelve people within the sample self-reported as being religious. Since religious practices are typically restricted or prohibited by the Chinese government, truthfully reporting one's religious faith during the survey could be considered a risk-taking action of its own. Indeed, as suggested by column 1, self-described religious individuals in the sample also express less risk aversion during the game. The coefficient of loss aversion, l, is the dependent variable in column 2. A higher l represents a higher of loss aversion. Spending more time working on the farm could also predict a higher loss aversion coefficient. In column 3, the nonlinear probability weighting parameter, a, is estimated using OLS. The only determinant that can marginally predict the nonlinear probability weighting parameter is education.
V. Conceptual Framework
This section introduces a simple conceptual framework through which to understand the role of risk preference parameters in the technology adoption decision process. In the case of Bt cotton planting, a few sources of uncertainty could influence farmers' technology adoption decisions. First, the ex ante pest severity during each season is unknown when farmers make their decision about whether to grow Bt cotton. Second, although scientific evidence shows that Bt cotton is superior to traditional cotton, for various reasons, the subjective view of the yield risk of Bt cotton could be different. 25 For example, farmers might believe that the performance of Bt cotton is plot specific, or they could be skeptical about the extension agents' claims about Bt cotton efficacy since these agents' salaries are tied to the sales of farming inputs .
For simplicity, assume that there is only one type of pest, cotton bollworm. I normalize the sales price of cotton yield Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Significant at *10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. All regressions include village fixed effects.
23 The ongoing debate between PT and EU is not this paper's focus. The above results could only reject one specific standard EU functional form. However, there are many other forms of utility functions, including those presented in Saha (1993) , the random utility model, and the EU with prudence measure. One can probably construct a theoretical EU model involving prudence that would cause farmers to adopt the technology later without invoking the use of PT. Empirically, it would be difficult to test the model since there are few experiments designed to elicit the measure of prudence (Deck & Schlesinger, 2010) . It is far beyond the scope of this paper to take a stand on whether EU or PT is better. I can only cautiously conclude that in this particular sample with the TCN utility function and setup, PT describes farmers' decisions better than EU does. 24 While Binswanger (1980) and Mosley and Verschoor (2005) find no correlation between wealth and risk aversion, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) suggest that wealthier households invest in riskier activities. See the survey by Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) for further discussion. 25 Various empirical studies such as Bellemare (2009), Cole et al. (2009) , and Lybbert and Just (2007) have shown the importance of subjective expectation when farmers make farming decisions.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS as 1 yuan per hectare and the cost of Bt cotton seeds (per hectare) is C BT yuan. 26 The cost of traditional cotton seeds (per hectare) is C T yuan. The difference in seed price between Bt cotton and traditional cotton is M ¼ C BT À C T . Suppose there are two states of the world: the normal pest level state, in which farmers spray b yuan worth of pesticide per hectare with probability (q), and the severe bollworm infestation state (1 À q), in which farmers spray 2b yuan worth of pesticide per hectare. I can express the profit of traditional cotton as a lottery, L T :
To capture the uncertainty farmers have about Bt cotton efficacy, as suggested by Yang et al. (2005) , the probability of perceived effectiveness is p, and Bt cotton is perceived as ineffective with probability (1 À p). When Bt cotton is effective, farmers do not need to spray any pesticide, but when it is ineffective, they need to spray as much pesticide as they use on the traditional cotton. Therefore, we can express Bt cotton's yield as the following lottery:
To simplify the notation, if we rescale and set (1 -b À C BT ) as the reference point, we can rewrite the lottery as follows:
Suppose a farmer has to choose either Bt cotton or traditional cotton seeds at the beginning of planting season. A farmer could infer from experience the size of q, the probability of bollworm pest infestation. A farmer would select Bt cotton if UðL BT Þ À UðL T Þ > 0 where U(Á) takes the same form as the TCN design in equation (1). The probability of choosing Bt cotton over traditional cotton is described by the density function:
From the literature on Bt cotton performance in China, we can infer the relative size of M, b, and q (see Huang, Hu et al., 2002 on Bt cotton in China). The difference in cost of seeds, M, is small relative to the difference in the cost of pesticides, b. (1 À q), the probability of severe bollworm infestation, is also a small probability. We would analyze the adoption decision based on the perceived efficacy of Bt cotton (the size of p). If the farmer with the risk preference of an average person (s ¼ 0.48, l ¼ 3.47, and a ¼ 0.69) perceives Bt cotton to be ineffective (lim pÀ>0 þ ), the model would predict that farmers who are more risk averse, along with farmers who are more loss averse, would be less likely to adopt Bt cotton. It is intuitive that if Bt cotton is ineffective, it would have a higher yield variance and be more likely to lead to losses; therefore, farmers who are more loss averse or more risk averse should not adopt it. Of farmers who perceives Bt cotton to be effective (lim pÀ>1), with a higher yield and a lower variance compared to traditional cotton, those who are more risk averse or more loss averse would be more likely to adopt Bt cotton. The model prediction is ambiguous for the sign of a (see the online appendix for the mathematical derivation).
VI. Econometric Framework and Empirical Results
A. Econometric Framework
In this section, the main outcome variable of interest is the timing of Bt cotton adoption. Since I have retrospective data on the year of Bt cotton adoption, hazard models provide a natural framework for modeling adoption probabilities (Hannan & McDowell, 1984) .
Let t be the time elapsed from the time of first exposure to Bt cotton until adoption, X i (t) be a vector of relevant explanatory variables, and b be a vector of coefficients. Denoting the cumulative density function as F i ðtjX; bÞ¼ Prob ðT tjX; bÞ and the density function as f i ðtjX; bÞ, the hazard function indicating the probability of adopting Bt cotton at period t, conditional on no adoption by time {t À 1}, is defined as h i ðtjX; bÞ ¼ f i ðtÞ=½1 À F i ðtÞ. The general form of the proportional hazard function is
where h o (t) is the baseline hazard. To test whether hazard is time dependent, I use a Weibull baseline hazard specification.
B. Basic Specification
The estimates of the parameters of the duration model for Bt cotton adoption and associated standard errors are reported in table 4. Time of exposure to Bt cotton is defined as the year (1993) before the first subject in the sample adopted Bt cotton. Village fixed effects are controlled for in all specifications.
The main characteristic of interest is individual risk preference. In the literature, most studies do not have any 26 Cotton market buyers do not differentiate between Bt and traditional cotton. Therefore, the prices of Bt and traditional cotton are the same. The sensitivity to soil condition, water, and fertilizer inputs for both Bt cotton seeds and traditional cotton seeds are the same. Therefore, the yield of Bt cotton and traditional cotton without pests present could have been the same. 1395 TIME TO CHANGE WHAT TO SOW control for individual risk preference; therefore, the regression result in column 1 excludes the risk preferences parameter as a comparison. To interpret the coefficients, one needs to exponentiate coefficients reported in the table obtaining hazard ratios. For example, to interpret the coefficient of s in column 2, we need to exponentiate (À0.361) ¼ 0.69. This implies that the risk-averse individual with s ¼ 1 in the sample is 31% less likely to adopt Bt cotton than the risk-neutral individual (s ¼ 0) at any given time. In column 3, the result suggests that being 1 standard deviation (3.92) more loss averse than the average person in the sample would lower the probability of adoption by 12% at any given time. The sample size is smaller than that in table 3 because the households that were formed after the year of Bt cotton introduction (1993) were dropped.
27
One caveat about my data set is that it contains cross-sectional data, and the survey was conducted after the adoption of Bt cotton had taken place. As Besley and Case (1993) argue, in cross-sectional data, any ex post measure of covariates of interest could be affected by the adoption decision and is therefore endogenous. However, some demographic variables are less likely to suffer from endogeneity because they are fixed over time. As mentioned earlier, land is assigned to each household and is rather constant over time during this period.
28 Therefore, I can use the size of land reported in my survey as a proxy of land holdings in the past. In the earlier literature on technology adoption, size of land is usually treated as a proxy for wealth (Feder, 1980; Just & Zilberman, 1983) . Given China's land assignment policy, however, farm size may not be a good indicator of wealth. Therefore, it is not surprising that the coefficient on farm size is insignificant.
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Detailed social network information such as the one in Conley and Udry (2010) is missing from the survey. It can be a concern that the size of social networks may be correlated with risk preferences, and social network is also correlated with technology adoption. I can investigate the extent of this problem in two ways-first, by examining whether risk preferences are correlated with contemporaneous measures of social networks. If it is not correlated with contemporaneous social network proxies, it is less likely that risk preferences would be correlated with social networks prior to adoption. Second, I can include various social network proxies as a regressor in the duration analysis for Bt cotton adoption. A few proxies can measure how wide one's social network is:
Whether one is a village official. Time to walk to twenty neighbors (this was used in the previous version of the paper) Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. All regressions include village fixed effects. Sample exclude all households that were formed after 1993. a Age at time of exposure.
27 The results were not sensitive to the inclusion of these households. 28 Although there were some incidents of land redistribution over time, the data set does not have information on land redistribution that may have taken place in the village. In the CHNS data set mentioned in note 10, the question regarding land redistribution was asked only in 1993 and 1997 (the exact question read ''the year of last land redistribution''). The CHNS data set indicates that less than one-third of the farmers experienced land redistribution between 1993 to 1997, the relevant period for my study. To the extent that this size of land measure in 2006 is a noisy proxy for size of land prior to adoption, this could create more noise; thus, coefficients on risk preferences could be muted. 29 Ideally, I would like to include a set of farming characteristics from prior to Bt cotton adoption. In particular, one might imagine that farmers could self-insure by changing the composition of activities. If hedging is possible, then a more risk-averse individual could hedge his or her Bt cotton adoption with less risky projects. Therefore, individuals who are more risk averse would be able to adopt sooner than in the counterfactual scenario when there is no hedging capacity. In this case, the coefficients on risk preferences could be muted, which suggests that my finding on risk preferences could be a lower bound.
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Number of weddings attended last year. Number of people invited to your family's last festive celebration (wedding, house warming, baby shower, or major birthday, for example) prior to Bt cotton adoption. This could potentially be a noisy proxy for social network and wealth or credit constraint before Bt cotton adoption. A dummy variable indicating whether the interviewee's last name is among the most popular last names in the village.
None of the contemporaneous social network proxies is correlated with the risk aversion coefficient. 30 It suggests that among the sample of Chinese cotton farmers, risk preferences and various social network measures are uncorrelated.
Moreover, in table 4, once I control for risk preference, the social network proxy (Time to walk to Neighbors) is not statistically significant across all specifications. Potentially, the village official is most likely to have a large social network. I create a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is a village leader or an official. Throughout the analysis, the coefficient of the village leader dummy is insignificant, and the inclusion of this measure does not affect the magnitude or significance level of the coefficient for risk preferences. I also tried the other social network proxies proposed above. The coefficients on risk preferences are stable across various measures of social network proxy. The regression results, including these additional proxies, are available on request.
As expected, the coefficient on education is positive and significant, indicating that the more educated farmers adopt Bt cotton earlier. However, compared to either of the risk preference parameters, the impact of education is quantitatively small. Having one more year of education would imply a 4.3 percentage point increase in the probability of adopting Bt at any given time. Bt cotton was expected to be less labor intensive than traditional cotton since it does not require as much spraying of pesticide. Therefore, we should expect the families with a less available workforce to be more likely to adopt Bt cotton, implying a negative coefficient. The number of adults older than 28 years of age is a proxy for the families' labor force participation a decade ago. As predicted, the coefficient on this proxy is negative and significant at the 10% level.
In columns 5 and 6 of table 4, the nonlinear probability weighting measure (a) is included in the regressions. a defines the shape of the probability weighting function. A smaller a indicates an individual's tendency to overweight small probabilities. To ease the interpretation of the coefficient on a, I create a dummy variable for column 6 in which a dummy variable equal to 1 indicates an individual who puts excessive decision weight on small probabilities (a < 1) and a dummy variable equal to 0 indicates an individual who does not overweight small probabilities (a ! 1). Results from columns 5 and 6 suggest that individuals who overweight small probabilities are more likely to adopt Bt cotton at any given time than individuals who do not overweight. It suggests that the farmers who overweight the probability of a severe pest infestation would be those who are more likely to adopt the Bt cotton.
C. Wealth Measure
One variable I would like to include in the specification but is not available in this data set is a measure of wealth prior to Bt cotton adoption. Studies suggest that wealth affects technology adoption because it is associated with credit constraints (which we did not ask about in this data set) and greater access to resources. To deal with this possible concern, I present two robustness checks in this section.
First, ideally I would like to include a measure of baseline wealth. The only proxy I have is information about each household's ownership of DG in 2001. 31 However, the interpretation of this coefficient on ex post wealth measure requires caution. In columns 1 and 2 of table 5, I present results with the number of DG owned in 2001 as a proxy for baseline wealth. Using this proxy for wealth, I implicitly give the same weight to each DG when I measure household wealth. Certainly there are some DG that are more expensive and less commonly owned, such as cars and motorcycles. Hence, I follow the procedure developed by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and estimate a wealth index using principal components analysis. I use these wealth indices as proxies for baseline wealth; the regression results are presented in columns 3 and 4. While there is some remaining uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the wealth coefficient, the interpretations of the coefficients on risk preferences parameters are robust to including this measure of wealth in the specification.
Second, if one supposes that credit constraints are correlated with risk preferences and negatively correlated with technology adoption, then this leads to a bias in the estimates. Credit constraints for adoption decisions are less likely to play a role in wealthier farm households, and as a result, the estimate bias should be minimal among those households. Therefore, in the following analysis, I restrict the sample to the wealthier households in 2001. The results with only the top 33rd percentile of wealthy households are presented in column 5, and the results with only the top 25th percentile of wealthy households are presented in column 6. While the smaller sample sizes increase standard errors, the signs across all risk attitudes parameters are 30 The table can be found in the online appendix. 31 In the previous draft of this paper, I included a noisy measure of 1999 DG ownership. We had asked farmers about a list of DG they had owned in 2006 and 2001. If they reported that they had owned a particular DG, we then inquired in what year they bought it. Using the year reported, we can estimate the number of DG owned in 1999. A very noisy measure results from this method since in 1999, more than half of the farmers owned only one DG on the list. 1397 TIME TO CHANGE WHAT TO SOW consistent. More important, risk aversion, which is most susceptible to being a biased estimate, remains significant at a 5% level.
In addition, unlike other types of agricultural investments (such as buying a tractor or installing a new irrigation system), buying Bt cotton seeds does not require a large lumpsum payment because the adoption of this cotton is not an all-or-nothing decision. If the farmers were to plant only Bt cotton in the earlier year, it would cost him about five to ten days' worth of wages. If the farmers were truly credit constrained but would like to try Bt cotton seeds, they could purchase a small amount, in lieu of traditional cotton, with which to experiment. In my study, given that I measure only time to adoption, these farmers would have been recorded as switching to Bt cotton. Therefore, credit constraint is not a sufficient explanation for why Chinese cotton farmers delayed their decision to adopt Bt cotton. I test several measures of wealth as a proxy for baseline wealth and find the results for risk preferences to be robust. I also left out wealth in the regression, and the regression results were robust. Given the lack of a compelling reason to incorporate an endogenous wealth measure, I leave out the wealth measure from the remainder of the study.
32
D. Robustness Check-Other Concerns
In this sample, twenty farmers adopted Bt cotton before it was commercialized. One could suspect that these farmers who were able to obtain the seeds prior to official commercialization could possibly have behaved differently from the rest of the sample. As a robustness check, I exclude them from the sample and redefine the time of exposure as 1996 for everyone in the sample; the results are presented in column 1 of table 6. The interpretations of the coefficients do not vary too much from regression results with the full sample.
Whether these farmers understand how the game works is a major concern. As mentioned earlier, 7.6% of total farmers choose either all lottery A or all lottery B in all three series. If these farmers simply do not understand the game, they add noise to the estimates. As long as their choices during the experiment are not systematically correlated with their adoption decisions, coefficients are not biased. 33 In column 2, I exclude those 7.6% of individuals Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. DG ¼ Durable goods. All regressions include village fixed effects. The sample excludes all households that were formed after 1993. Columns 1 and 2 use number of durable goods owned as a proxy for wealth. Columns 3 and 4 use a wealth index as a proxy for wealth. Column 5 is restricted to those in the top one-third of the wealth bracket. Column 6 is restricted to those in the top one-fourth of the wealth bracket. Columns 2 and 4 use a dummy variable indicating weather alpha is smaller than 1. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 6 use a direct alpha measure.
32 It is debatable as to which problem is more serious: omitted variable bias or including an endogenous variable. I have performed the regression analysis for both with and without wealth. Given that the results are similar, it is less of a concern. The replication of table 6 with wealth variable is available upon request. 33 One could argue that farmers with extremely low cognitive ability may be the ones who choose all risky options (all lottery B selections) in the game as well as adopt Bt cotton the latest. Therefore, the estimate on risk preference could be biased upward. It is as likely that those with low cognitive ability could choose all safe options in the game (all lottery A selections) but they adopt Bt cotton later; then it would be downward bias. A priori, it is not clear in which direction the bias would occur. However, excluding individuals who seem not to not understand the game should provide us with a better estimate.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS from the full sample. The impacts of risk aversion and loss aversion coefficients on technology adoption are even more prominent compared to the similar specification with the full sample in table 5. In column 3 of table 6, I cluster the standard errors at the village level. All the coefficients remain robust. The specification above, without the individuals who seem to have trouble understanding the game, could be preferable. In the following regressions, I exclude those individuals again. Up to this point, time of exposure to Bt cotton is defined as the year (1993) before the first person in the sample adopted it. It is possible that Bt cotton was not available to all farmers at that time, especially considering that this survey covers four provinces. Therefore, I redefine the exposure date as the year before the first person adopted Bt cotton in each province. Results are shown in column 4 of table 6. In column 5, the exposure date is defined as the year before the first person adopted Bt cotton in that county.
34
In this section, I have shown that the coefficients of interest remain robust across alternative specifications. These results suggest a strong relationship between attitudes toward risk and Bt cotton adoption decision making.
E. Robustness Check-Specification
In this section, I estimate these relationships by using different specifications. So far, my parametric estimates of the hazard model assume that h o (t) in equation 1 follows a Weibull distribution. I relax this assumption by estimating the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) . Column 6 in table 6 provides the results of the Cox model. The advantage of this model is that I can estimate b without directly estimating h o (t) in exchange for a loss of efficiency. The coefficient on s remains negative but insignificant. The coefficients on l and a remain robust. 35 In section VIB, when I assume a Weibull hazard model, I find that hazard of adoption is time dependent and increases over time. The results from s, l, and a are not particularly sensitive to the functional form of the baseline hazard I use.
One might be concerned that I impose too strong a functional form assumption on the value function when I derive the risk preference parameters. It would be interesting to see if the experiment produces any predictions for the adoption decision without having to assume a specific utility functional form. Therefore, as a robustness check without using any function form, I divide the subjects into eighteen groups based on the sets of switching points across the three elicitation tasks (see figure 3) . Individuals who choose to switch to the riskier lottery option during the first iteration for all three series would belong to group 1 (the most riskseeking group); individuals who choose to never switch in all three series would belong to group 18 (the most riskaverse group). The advantage of this simple division of the subjects into eighteen groups is that we can capture nonparametric representation of risk preferences from the Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. All regressions include village fixed effects. Sample exclude all households that were formed after 1993. Columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 use the same sample as column 2.
34 It is not sensible to define the time of exposure as the year before the first person adopted Bt cotton in the village because we surveyed only twenty households in each village. It is very likely that someone adopted Bt cotton earlier than the first person reported in the village in the sample but that this individual was not interviewed and therefore did not show up in the sample. 35 As a specification check, I assume baseline hazard has a Gompertz specification, which is also monotonic. Regression results are not presented, but the coefficient and significance of risk preference parameters remain robust. 1399 TIME TO CHANGE WHAT TO SOW experiment instead of using labels such as risk aversion, loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting. In the duration model, instead of using three risk preference parameters, I replace them with seventeen dummy variables. The estimated coefficients on the dummy variables are reported in table 7, and the number of observations in each group is reported in brackets. It is less meaningful and less intuitive to interpret the coefficients in table 7. More important, an F test rejects the null hypothesis that the seventeen dummy variables are jointly equal to 0 at a 99.9% confidence level. It is evidence that the design of this field experiment can predict the timing of farmers' adoption even after controlling for village fixed effect and farmers' individual characteristics. Now that I have demonstrated the connection between the TCN field experiment and technology adoption, the next step is to confirm if the risk preference parameters under the taxonomy of PT can capture the essence of the game and provide a more meaningful interpretation than the group dummy variables Therefore, I perform a horse race between the full specification model (including the seventeen dummy variables and the three risk preference parameters as regressors) and the nested specification model (which includes only three risk preference parameters). Since the latter model is the nested model of the full specification, I can test these two competing specifications. 36 The result from the likelihood ratio test indicates that adding the seventeen dummy variables does not improve the fit of the model at the 5% level compared with a model containing only three risk preference parameters.
Using the result from the F test, I can conclude that the nonparametric results from this experiment (represented by simply dividing them into groups) still provide some predictions for the timing of adoption. Furthermore, with the result from the likelihood ratio test, I can conclude that these three risk preference parameters derived from the structured value function have already captured the essence of this game without using the nonstructured, group dummy variables.
F. Further Discussion
One concern regarding this study is that I have only ex post measures of attitudes toward risk. This situation might be problematic if risk preferences have changed because of farmers' adoption decisions. While it is probable, all of the farmers in the context of this study had adopted Bt cotton by the time the risk experiments were conducted. Therefore, unless the timing of Bt cotton adoption has a differential impact on risk preferences, it is less of a concern.
37 The extent to which the adoption of new technology affects individual risk preferences or, more broadly, the stability of individual risk aversion over time, is beyond the scope of this paper.
The lack of a baseline wealth measure may seem to pose a problem since it often serves as a proxy for the credit Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. All regressions include county fixed effects. Number of observations in each group is in brackets.
36 In order to run a likelihood ratio test, the standard errors from these regressions cannot be robust standard errors. 37 Jaeger et al. (2010) investigates the relationship between risk attitudes and migration decisions while accommodating a similar problem (of having no baseline data). Taking advantage of the fact that risk preference parameters were collected in 2004 and migration occurred between 2000 and 2006, they find that individual risk attitude measures are significant both in ex ante and ex post migration decisions.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS constraint farmers face at the time of adoption. If credit constraint is positively correlated with risk aversion and credit-constrained individuals adopt Bt cotton later, then the coefficients suffer from upward bias. It is also possible that farmers can save money from lesser pesticide costs after adopting Bt cotton seeds, resulting in the more creditconstrained farmers possibly having greater incentives to use Bt cotton seeds and thus adopt Bt cotton earlier. In this case, the coefficients would suffer from a downward bias.
Overall, it is difficult to determine the direction of this omitted-variable bias. However, as explained in section VIC, farmers could sow a portion of their farmland with Bt cotton seeds according to what their budget constraints allow. Although I cannot rule out that credit constraints could bias the results, we test several measures of wealth as a proxy for baseline wealth and find the results for risk preferences to be robust. Another limitation of this study is that instead of risk aversion, uncertainty aversion (ambiguity aversion) might be at play in this context. A commonly used definition that distinguishes risk versus (Knightian) uncertainty is that ''risk is imperfect knowledge where the probabilities of the possible outcomes are known, and (Knightian) uncertainty exists when these probabilities are unknown'' (Hardaker et al., 1997) . 38 When farmers need to make the adoption decision, they do not have perfect information on the distribution of cotton yields, and therefore uncertainty aversion (ambiguity aversion) should be the key factor in their technology adoption decisions. Even if one believes that uncertainty aversion ought to play a more prominent role, we find that the results are significant across various specifications, and this could suggest that the risk-aversion measures from the experiment may be a good proxy for uncertainty aversion. Finally, the model suggests that the subjective view of yield risk of Bt cotton could be different from the objective risk of Bt cotton. One factor that can drive farmers to have a biased subjective view could be due to the lack of trust of extension agents, whose salaries are tied to the sales of farming inputs . One's attitude of trust could potentially play an important role in farmers' adoption decision. However, with the current data set, I cannot further test this hypothesis. 39 
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, I find that farmers with higher risk aversion or higher loss aversion adopt Bt cotton later, while farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt Bt cotton earlier.
In other words, the less risk-averse or less loss-averse farmers would be able to accumulate more wealth from this technological innovation by adopting it earlier. Given that Bt cotton is no riskier than traditional cotton, the findings suggest that the farmers' perceived risk and potential loss influence their technology adoption decisions.
The findings have important policy implications. From a policymaker's point of view, crop insurance can potentially be offered to hedge against the risk and fear of loss associated with the adoption of the new technology. However, the design and implementation of the insurance could be challenging since it should minimize adverse selection and moral hazard problems while remaining simple enough for farmers with low levels of education to understand. 40 From a business point of view, as Sunding and Zilberman (2001) suggested, seeds with money-back guarantees can be a means to persuade farmers to try the new seeds. In terms of reducing the perceived risk associated with the new technology, the government can set up demonstration plots in each village. Demonstration plots would help farmers understand the characteristics of the new technology within a growing condition that is similar to their own. Standards of living across different continents were quite similar until the rate of technological progress increased dramatically in the nineteenth century. Many economists have sought to uncover the underlying reasons for this disparity in wealth accumulation and economic growth in the past two centuries. Some economists have alluded to cross-country differences in technology adoption (Comin & Hobijn, 2004) . The findings in this paper suggest that less risk-averse or less loss-averse farmers could accumulate more wealth by more quickly embracing technological innovations. If risk attitudes are transmitted across generations from parents to children, as Dohmen et al. (2008) and Cesarini et al. (2009) suggested, we would see persistence in intergenerational poverty or widening inequality over time. Therefore, understanding the role of risk preference in technology adoption could help us understand persistent poverty in developing countries.
